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I. INTRODUCTION
Rules and principles of international law relating to transboundary
watercourses have evolved since as early as 2,500 BC when Lagash and Umma
resorted to treaty law to resolve a dispute along the Tigris River.' A U.N.
Environment Program ("UNEP") study identified 3,600 transboundary
watercourse treaties dating from 805 A.D. to 1984.2 The study also concluded
that "158 of the world's 263 international basins lack any type of cooperative
management framework;" and most of the remaining, lack the tools necessary to
promote long-term, holistic water management. 3  However, international law
relating to transboundary watercourses is not only found in basin-specific treaty
practice. In addition, various legal expert groups, such as the International Law
Commission ("ILC"), International Law Association ("ILA"), and International
Law Institute ("LI") have sought to develop consensus around rules and
principles that are generally applicable to transboundary watercourses at the
global level.4 Most notable in relation to global efforts to develop law in the field
is the adoption of the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses in 1997 (1997 UN Watercourses Convention).'
While the 1997 Watercourses Convention has not yet entered into force, it
remains the most influential articulation of existing and emerging customary
international law at the global level.6
1. AARON T. WOLF, U.N. NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, ATLAS OF INTERNATIONAL FRESHWATER
AGREEMENTS 5 (2002), available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/atlas-
pdf/1 _Front_atlas.pdf.
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 7.
4. See, e.g., SLAVKO BOGDANOVI, INT'L LAW OF WATER RESOURCES: CONTRIBUTION OF THE INT'L
LAW ASSOCIATION (1954-2000) 90-92 (2001).
5. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 700.
6. See FLAVIA LOURES, ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE & MARIE-LAURE VERCAMBRE, EVERYTHING YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION (2008) http://assets.panda.org/downloads/
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Additionally, a large body of international institutions has evolved at the
global, regional and basin-specific levels to address issues surrounding the
equitable and sustainable management of transboundary watercourses.
Institutions with an interest in transboundary waters issues range from global
organizations such as the World Bank, UNEP, UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, UN Development Program and UN Food and Agricultural
Organization; regional organizations, such as UN Economic Commission for
Europe, Southern African Development Community, and Asian Development
Bank ("ADB"); donor organizations, such as the UK Department for
International Development; multinational companies, such as SWECO or
Halcrow; and last but not least, specific institutions set up to facilitate
cooperation at the basin level, such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC), or
the Danube River Commission. These organizations are often charged with
supporting or implementing transboundary water legal systems without the
necessary mechanisms being in place to ensure full compliance; this issue of
implementation and compliance is developed further later in this paper. Besides
these, there are also a number of transboundary water commissions tasked with
coordinating information exchanges and cooperation between countries sharing
an international watercourse, which are not subject to specific legal agreements!
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interplay between law and
institutions within the context of international watercourses. More specifically,
the paper seeks to understand how the content of substantive and procedural
international law influences the effectiveness of institutions and vice-versa. In
considering such issues, the paper accepts that there is no one-size-fits all
solution. The paper therefore takes the approach of examining how laws and
institutions have interacted within the specific context of the Sesan River
between Vietnam and Cambodia; and, more specifically, how the design of the
relevant institutions and the context of the applicable laws have influenced state
behavior. Ultimately, the conclusions of the paper apply to the Sesan. However,
it is hoped that the conclusions also illustrate the need for a more joined up
approach to the analysis of international watercourses in order to deepen
knowledge and understanding as to how laws and institutions can be better
designed to ensure equitable cooperation between States. 9
wwf-un-watercourses-brochure low-res-july2009rev-en.pdf; see also U.N. Educ. Scientic and Cultural Org.
[UNESCO], The Role and Relevance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non- Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses to the EU and its Member States (2008) (prepared by Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia
Loures), available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/WWF/RAEuropeanUnion.pdf.
7. See U.N. Educ. Scientic and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Institutions for Int'l Freshwater Management
4-6 (2003) (prepared by Stefano Burchi & Melvin Spreij), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001324/132478e.pdf (explaining various agreements and the organizational structures that were
agreed upon).
8. See, e.g., Nile Basin Initiative, http://www.nilebasin.org (follow About NBI hyperlink).
9. See also Alistair Rieu-Clarke, The Role of Treaties in Building International Watercourse Regimes: A
Legal Perspective on Existing Knowledge, Water Pol'y (forthcoming publication).
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The Sesan has been chosen as an example because it represents a river where
there is a pressing need to enhance governance arrangements at the
transboundary level due to existing and potential hydropower developments.
These developments are, to date, predominantly in Vietnam, but in the future
may also develop in Cambodia. The challenge facing water governance in the
Sesan is that the hydro-electric power ("HEP") station dams built in Vietnam
have had considerable impact of water flows in the Sesan and have detrimentally
affected fishing and river-side farming in the Cambodian (down-stream) parts of
the river. While energy production generated by the dams is important to
Vietnamese efforts to modernize their country and raise standards of living, the
dams have undoubtedly had adverse effects on the livelihoods of the largely rural
communities in Cambodia.
In focusing on equitable cooperation, the paper takes the position that the
existence of a treaty, such as the 1995 Mekong Agreement, does not necessarily
result in positive cooperation, especially in cases where one of the countries is a
hegemon-that is, dominates relationships between countries through its access
to greater economic, political or other resources. This domination can be either
global or regional. As Zeitoun and Warner point out, cooperation is not always
voluntary. A hegemon can make other parties "do what they would otherwise not
do."' This type of involuntary action is not necessarily the result of the use of
force; Gramsci for example used the term hegemony to refer to the sets of ideas
that rulers use to gain legitimacy." A key issue running throughout the paper is
therefore to ask not only whether international law and institutions have resulted
in cooperation, but also whether such cooperation has been equitable. Where
inequity arises a further question to consider is whether and how the applicable
laws and institutions can be strengthened to ensure a fairer balance between
competing state interests.
In order to achieve its purpose of examining the interplay between the laws
and institutions applicable to the Sesan River, this paper will initially provide the
context in which such laws and institutions operate. In so doing, the political and
historical context to international relations around the Sesan will be examined,
along with the physical, economic, environmental and social characteristics of
the river. Given its central influence in influencing relations over the Sesan,
existing and planned hydropower operations will then be detailed together with
the reported transboundary impacts of such projects. The paper goes on to
consider the substantive international law applicable to the Sesan, which includes
an examination of the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, the
obligation to take all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm, and the
obligation to protect ecosystems of international watercourses within the context
10. See Mark Zeitoun & Jeroen Warner, Hydro-hegemony-A Framework for Analysis of Trans-
Boundary Water Conflicts, 8 WATER POL'Y 435 (2006).
11. See ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MAKING
OF HISTORY 311 (1987).
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of hydropower developments. Having considered the applicable substantive
norms, the paper then goes on to consider the procedural rules and institutional
mechanisms that are in place to implement such norms. Such an analysis
includes an examination of the role of the Mekong River Commission, relevant
national institutions, the rule of notification and consultation, and environmental
impact assessment procedures in relation to hydropower developments. The
paper then concludes by firstly highlighting the way in which laws and
institutions have interacted within the context of the Sesan; and secondly
suggesting how such interaction could be strengthened in order to facilitate
equitable cooperation over the Sesan River.
II. THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Before moving on to the description and analyses of the Sesan River itself it
is necessary to provide a short description of the political and historical context
with which river management, as well as legal and institutional relations around
the Sesan, work.
The Sesan is a tributary of the Mekong and flows from the highlands of
Vietnam into northeast Cambodia. It flows, in fact, through a region with a
violent and contested history, and as a border region of Vietnam it is still treated
as a special case by the Vietnamese government. Later in this paper the role of
the hegemon, a dominant regional or global power, will be discussed. Today
Vietnam is a fast-developing country with growing standards of living for its
population (although poverty is still widespread in some parts of the country)
while Cambodia has still not recovered from the violence and genocide of the
Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot in the 1970's. As will be seen, Vietnam's
legitimate demands for energy modernization and improvements in standards of
living are, in the Sesan, balanced against the livelihoods of the rural populations
living along the Sesan in Cambodia. The dilemma is to satisfy the needs of both
parties. Yet the balance of economic and political power is not even. While
Vietnam is a relatively well-organized socialist country with clear lines of
responsibility and decision-making, Cambodia must be characterized as a weak
state, a country where political and administrative institutions often lack the
legitimacy necessary for the smooth functioning of society.
This has not always been the case. For while the balance of power between
Vietnam and Cambodia is now in Vietnam's favor, Cambodia, in the form of the
Khmer empire from the eleventh to fourteenth centuries, was once the regional
hegemon. Vietnam and Cambodia have a long history of conflict dating to both
before and after the Khmer empire. During the Vietnam War the Ho Chi Min
Trail, a lifeline for the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam, went through the
northeastern provinces where the Sesan is located. During the Khmer Rouge
years, the northeast was, as a region with many ethnic minorities, especially
harshly affected. In 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and stayed in the country
for more than ten years.
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This context of historical antagonism and unequal economic development is
essential in understanding how and why the Sesan area is governed. The
situation is exacerbated because in both Vietnam and Cambodia Sesan flows
through the least developed areas in the two countries. This further complicates
communication and joint efforts by local water managers to solve problems.
One must remember that in the parts of the Sesan in Vietnam and Cambodia
very different political systems have developed; Vietnam is a socialist republic
with relatively clear lines of decision-making and responsibility, even though, as
we point out, they are not always sufficiently transparent. In the provinces of the
Central Highlands, regional and local people's committees hold political power
and, under the auspices of the central government, make decisions. In Cambodia,
on the other hand, governmental authorities and departments are weak in the
Sesan provinces and NGO's play an important and influential role. In both
countries information regarding the Sesan is sparse, either because of political
realities or simple lack of data.
More will be said about the institutional arrangements of water management
in the Sesan later in this paper, we will now move to descriptions of hydrology,
livelihoods, and the all-important issue of HEP development on the river.
Ill. THE SESAN RIVER BASIN
A. Hydrological Aspects
The tributaries of the Mekong play a major role in the regions' water regime
and the Srepok and Sesan rivers contribute around ten percent to the total flow of
the Mekong River.12 The Sesan River flows from its source in the Central
Highlands of Vietnam through the fast developing Vietnamese provinces of Gia
Lia and Kon Tum before entering the province of Ratanikiri in Cambodia and on
to Stung Treng Province, where it converges with the Srepok before meeting the
main channel of the Mekong at Stung Treng town (see figure I). 3 The total
catchment area of the Sesan-on of the largest tributaries of the Mekong - is
18,750 km2, forty percent (6,960 km2) being located in Cambodia, and sixty
percent (11,450 km2) situated in Vietnam.1 4 The Sesan Basin is predominantly
mountainous, although there are two large plains; the high plateau in Vietnam
which stretches from Kontum to Ban Me Throut, and the valley around Voeun
Sai in Cambodia.
5
12. ASIAN DEV. BANK, SE KONG, SE SAN AND NAM THEUN RIVER BASINS' HYDROWPOWER STUDY 5-1
(1999).
13. SWECO GRONER ET AL., FINAL REPORT-ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE CAMBODIAN PART
OF THE SE SAN RIVER DUE TO HYDROPOWER DEV. IN VIETNAM 21 (2006).
14. Id.
15. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 12, at 7-7.
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FIGURE 1-THE SESAN RIVER BASIN
© 2002 Australian Mekong Resource Centre
The river is influenced by a large-scale monsoon circulation, which brings
dry air masses to the basin between December and March resulting in little or no
rainfall. Conversely, during May to December the summer monsoon brings
nearly the entire annual rainfall; and from October to November tropical
cyclones can lead to extreme flooding.1
6
B. Ecosystems and Livelihoods
The estimated total population of the Sesan is around 90,000.' The River is
home to many minority groups and indigenous peoples, including Lao, Bana,
Brou, Gia Lai, Kinh, Kreung, Kachok, Jarai, Ro Ngao, Tampuon, Kavet, and
Chinese." "Traditionally people in the region have relied on subsistence
agriculture and fishing," and have accordingly developed small-scale water
utilization techniques.' 9 However, around Kon Turn Town, the agriculture is
16. SWECO, supra note 13, at 48.
17. Austl. Mekong Resource Ctr., Hydropower Dev. in the Se San Watershed, http://www.mekong.
es.usyd.edu.au/case-studies/sesan/sesanwatershed/sesanwatershed.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
18. CTR. FOR NATURAL RES. & ENVTL. STUDIES, VIETNAM NAT'L UNIV., STUDY INTO IMPACT OF YALI
FALLS DAM ON RESETTLED AND DOWNSTREAM COMMUNITIES 7-8 (2001).
19. Geoffrey D. Gooch, Presentation at the the CAIWA Int'l Conference on Adapative & Integrated
Water Management: Evolving Water Governance Systems: The Case Of The Sesan River in South-East Asia
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relatively intensive with large-scale irrigation systems. The development of HEP
dams has resulted in the relocation of rural communities in Vietnam and the
construction of new villages for these displaced people as large areas are now
covered by water.20 As in many cases in developing countries, the highland
locations suitable for HEP development are also home to ethnic communities and
the rural poor.2' While the effects of the dams on these communities is
significant, the Vietnamese government also has in place a policy to help these
relocated persons with the construction of new houses etc. In Cambodia
however, such a policy to alleviate the effects of HEP production are not in place.
The following sections describe some of the key downstream impacts of the
Vietnamese HEP production.
IV. HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND ITS DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS
A. National Energy Demands and Hydropower in the Sesan
In Vietnam, "growth in demand for power between 2001 and 2020 is
estimated to be ten to eleven percent annually and peak demand is expected to
grow from 4,800 Megawatts (MW) in 2000" to around 27,000-32,400 MW in
2020.22 The growth in demand is largely fuelled by the rapidly growing economy
that is forecast at around eight percent until 2010.23 Responsibility for electricity
supply rests with the state owned utility, Electricity of Vietnam ("EVN"), which
was founded in 1995. Currently, electricity generation in Vietnam consists of
thermal gas-based power plants (thirty-nine percent), thermal coal (sixteen
percent), and hydropower (thirty-seven percent). 24  Vietnam also imports
electricity from China.25 EVN has earmarked hydropower as a key sector that
could be developed in order to satisfy energy demands in Vietnam. At present,
existing and under construction hydropower plants total approximately 4,000• • 26
MW, and a total 18,000-20,000 MW hydropower potential has been identified.
and the Use of Actor-Network Theory as an Analytical Tool 1 (2007), available at http://kvina.niva.
no/striver/Portals/0/documents/GoochextendedabstractCAIWA_2007pdf.pdf.
20. CTR. FOR NATURAL RES., supra note 18, at 6.
21. ANDERS HJORT-AF-ORNAS, TURNING HYDROPOWER SOCIAL: WHERE GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY
CONVENTIONS MATrER 89 (2008).
22. JOAKIM OJENDAL ET AL., ENVTL. GOVERNANCE IN THE MEKONG - HYDROPOWER SITE SELECTION
PROCESSES IN THE SE SAN AND SRE POK BASINS 29 (2002), available at http://sei-intemational.
org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Policy-institutions/ environmental-govemance-mekong.pdf.
23. Frost & Sullivan, Vietnam's Power Sector Eying Inv. from the Private Sector (Sept. 21, 2006),
http://www.frost.comprod/servlet/market-insight-top.pag?docid=82310494.
24. Nhan T. Nguyen & Minh Ha-Duong, Econ. Potential of Renewable Energy in Vietnam's Power
Sector, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 1601, 1602 (2009).
25. Electricity Production Rises, but Shortfalls Still Loom in Dry Season, VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY,
Apr. 13, 2009, http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/showarticle.php?num=04ECO 130409.
26. Nguyen, supra note 24, at 1610.
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Cambodia, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, has the lowest
per capita consumption of electricity in Asia at around 50 kWh, and poor
infrastructure and regulation. "[E]lectricity prices in Cambodia are [among] the
highest in the region, [due in part] to the large use of old and small generators,
fully imported diesel fuel, and.., losses in low quality medium voltage
distribution systems. '27 Hydropower potential in Cambodia has been estimated at
5,300-8,135 MW of installed capacity based upon 65 major hydropower plants.28
Total energy generation is estimated at 41,400 GWh/year, of which 13,000
GWh/year would be generated in the Northeast of the country.29 However, to
date Cambodia has lacked the resources by which to exploit large-scale
hydropower development.
The idea of harnessing the potential to develop hydropower on the Sesan is
not a new one. Indeed, "[p]lans to develop a large dam at Yali Falls have existed
since the French colonial period, and a French entrepreneur was granted a
concession to construct a hydroelectric dam at Yali Falls in 1929." 30 However,
lack of capital meant that the concession was ultimately revoked prior to
construction. 3' It was not until the 1950s and the so-called "Wheeler Report,"
that the entire Lower Mekong River Basin was studied for large and medium
scale development projects, including the Sesan.32 From the 60's to the 90's, a
succession of studies reviewed these plans. A Master Plan (General Report) on
the Se San River Basin, which was updated by SWECO in association with
Statkraft Engineering in 1997; and subsequently reviewed by an Asian
Development Bank ("ADB"), the funded Halcrow study entitled, Se Kong-Se San
and Nam Thun River Basins Hydropower Study, refined the number of sites in
the Sesan down to 7 in Vietnam (Sesan 3, Sesan 3A, Sesan 4, Dak Bla, Plei
Krong, Upper Kon Turn and Yali) and 5 in Cambodia (seefigure 2). 3
27. AUSTL. Bus. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ASIA: THE CAMBODIA
REPORT 2 (2005).
28. OJENDAL, supra note 22, at 29.
29. Id.
30. Andrew B. Wyatt & Ian G. Baird, Transboundary Impact Assesment in the Sesan River Basin: The
Case of the Yali Falls Dam, 23 INT'L J. OF WATER RESOURCES DEV. 427,428 (2007).
31. Id.
32. PHILIPPE FLOCH, FRANCOIS MOLLE & WILLIBALD LOISKANDL, MARSHALLING WATER RES.: A
CHRONOLOGY OF IRRIGATION DEV. IN THE CHI-MUN RIVER BASIN, NORTHEAST THAILAND 19, available at
http://www.sea-user.org/download pubdoc.php?doc=3629.
33. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 12, table following 6-1.
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FIGURE 2-PLANED AND EXISTING HYDROPOWER PROJECTS IN THE SESAN
B. Hydropower in Operation, Under Construction and Planned
The Yali hydropower project, located approximately 70 km2 upriver from the
Cambodian border, was the first development in the Sesan. This US$1.2 billion,
720 MW project, with an annual average energy potential of 3,146 GW/h, started
in November 1993.34 The filling of the 65 km2 reservoir was completed in May
1998, and the power plant was operational by January 2002."2 International aid
for the project was provided by loans from Russia and Ukraine; and technical
assistance provided from Switzerland, Sweden and organizations affiliated with
those countries, including SWECO, Statkraft Groener and Electrowatt
Engineering.36 An additional loan of US $575 million was provided by the World
Bank to build a 500km transmission line from Yali Falls to the capital, Ho Chi
Minh City.
7
34. WYATT, supra note 30, at 429.
35. NGO FORUM ON CAMBODIA, DOWN RIVER - THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM'S SE SAN RIVER
DAMS ON LIFE IN CAMBODIA AND THEIR MEANING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2005).
36. Id.
37. Ame Trandem, A Vietnamese/Cambodian Transboundary Dialogue: Impacts of Dams on the Se San
River, 51 DEV. 108, 109 (2008).
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A further three Vietnamese hydropower projects are in operation. Fifteen
kilometers downstream of Yali and approximately eighty kilometers from the
Cambodian border is the Sesan 3 hydropower project.31 Construction of the
260MW, US$320 million Sesan 3 began in May 2001, and the dam was
completed by 2006. Yali, the second largest hydropower plant in Vietnam, has a
reservoir surface area of 3.4 km2. Funding for Sesan 3 was originally secured
through the ADB. However, ADB demands for further environmental studies
and the resultant risk of delays meant that the Vietnamese government decided to
secure alternative funding through the Japanese government.39
Ten kilometers south of Sesan 3 is the location of Sesan 3A-a US $100
million, 96 MW hydropower project with a reservoir surface of 8.5 km. Sesan
3A provides an annual average energy potential of 1,225 GW/h. The project
started in April 2003 and the dam was in operation by the end of 2006.40 A credit
agreement for the project was signed between the developer and Bank for
Investment and Development of Vietnam, Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development, Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam, and Industrial and
Commercial Bank of Vietnam.4'
On a tributary of the Sesan in Vietnam, twenty kilometers west of the city of
Kon Turn, construction of the Pleikrong hydropower project commenced in 2003,
42 and will become operational in 2009.43 The US $88.5 million, 100 MW
hydropower project supplies 414 GW/h of annual average energy potential, and
has a reservoir surface of 53 km2. Funding for the Pleikrong hydropower project
was agreed through the same four Vietnamese banks that funded Sesan 3A."
A further two hydropower projects are under construction in Vietnam. The
Sesan 4 project is located close to the border between Vietnam and Cambodia.
Construction of the access roads for Sesan 4 commenced in April 2004 and the
dam is expected to be operational by 2010.41 Once complete this 330 MW is
expected to produce an annual average energy potential of 1,402 GW/h, and
construction costs are estimated at US $250 million.4'6 Finally, Sesan 4A, located
approximately five kilometers downstream from Sesan 4 and about one kilometer
from the Cambodian border, has been developed to provide a re-regulation of
intermittent outflow from upstream hydropower developments and therefore
38. Id.
39. OJENDAL, supra note 22, at 47.
40. SWECO, supra note 13, at 42.
41. Hydroelectric Power Plants in Vietnam, http://www.industcards.com/hydro-vietnamhtm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2009).
42. SWECO, supra note 13, at 41.
43. New Power Plants to Come into Operation in December, VIETNAM Bus. FIN. NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009,
http://www.vnbusinessnews.com/2009/12/new-power-plants-to-come-into-operation.html.
44. Local Banks Fund US $88.5M for Pleikrong Hydropower Project, VIETNAM Bus. FORUM,
http://vibforum.vcci.com.vn/newsdetail.asp?news-id=3880 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
45. SWECO, supra note 13, at 43.
46. Hydroelectric Power Plants in Vietnam, supra note 42.
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mitigate daily flow variations from the cascade of upstream dams.4 ' The dam,
expected to be completed this year at a cost of US$ 51 million, has been co-
financed by the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam and the
Vietnam-Russia Joint Venture Bank.
The 2006 SWECO report also identifies a further hydropower project in
Vietnam that is under planning: the Upper Kontum located in the uppermost part
48of the Sesan basin. The preliminary optimization study for the project suggests
that the dam would have an installed capacity of 260 MW.
49
In Cambodia, the 480 MW Sesan 2 has emerged as the most viable option for
hydropower development. Vietnam's Ministry of the Environment is reportedly
currently carrying out an environmental impact assessment, and Electricity of
Vietnam is believed to be financially supporting the project."' An estimated 1000
families are likely to be displaced by the dam in the province of Stung Treng.)
C. Downstream Impacts of the Hydropower Development Projects
A range of official and unofficial studies has sought to ascertain the
downstream impacts of the development of hydropower projects in Vietnam.52
Such impacts relate to unusual flooding events and fluctuations in river flow,
water quality, and loss of livelihoods.
1. Unusual Flooding Events and Fluctuations in River Flow
It is widely reported within the studies that the hydrological regime of the
Sesan has been irregular since late 1996 when there was major flooding. The
Fisheries Office report, notes that: "the massive and rapid floods that occurred in
October and November (water rose many meters over just a few hours) were the
result of water releases from a diversion dam built to facilitate the construction of
the main Yali Falls dam... ."" However, the SWECO report, commissioned by
Electricity of Vietnam, maintains that such an event is unlikely to have been
47. SWECO, supra note 13, at 46.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id. at 44.
50. Fergal Quinn & Chhom Chansy, Dam Proposal Raises Displacement Concerns, CAMBODIA DAILY,
Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/2970.
51. Id.
52. See SWECO, supra note 13; NGO Forum on Cambodia, supra note 36; Wyatt, supra note 30; THE
FISHERIES OFFICE, RATANAKIRI PROVINCE, A STUDY OF THE DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS OF THE YALI FALLS DAM
IN THE SE SAN RIVER BASIN IN RATANAKIRI PROVINCE (2000), available at http://www.mekong.es.usyd.edu.
au/casestudies/rbm/Resources/PDFs/RatanakiriYaliFallslmpactStudy-FNAL.pdf; ANDREA H. CLAASSEN,
ABUNDANCE, DISTRIBUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS OF SANDBAR NESTING BIRDS BELOW THE YALI
FALLS HYDROPOWER DAM ON THE SESAN RIVER, NORTHEAST CAMBODIA (2004); INGRID NESHEIM ET AL.,
STRIVER POLICY BRIEF, ENVRIONMENTAL FLOW, BIODIVERSITY AND LIVELIHOODS-THE CAUSAL CHAIN
(2009), available at http://kvina.niva.no/striver/Portals/O/documentsSTRIVERPB 12_EFCausalChain.pdf.
53. THE FISHERIES OFFICE, supra note 52, at 10.
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caused by Yali as the diversion dam only diverts water during construction and
does not build up a reservoir.-
In addition, major water surges have been reported, which Vietnam has
subsequently acknowledged are due to water releases from the Yali Falls Dam,
especially during the early stages of development and use of the dam.55 Such
events have resulted in the loss of life and livestock from drowning, washed
away boats and fishing nets, and destroyed crops.56 The SWECO report notes
that, "[r]apidly rising water level in the rainy season has been most likely caused
by spillway releases from the laly reservoir."57
In addition to significant flooding events, communities living downstream of
Yali in Cambodia have reportedly observed higher than normal river levels
fluctuations, which are considered to be due to the operational regime of Ialy s
Fishing practices, shellfish collection, agricultural production and the harvesting
of wild vegetables in exposed deep-water pools, riverbeds and riverbanks have
traditionally taken place during the dry season.59 Reported river flow variations
have also a significant impact both on wildlife and agricultural practices. One
study notes;
Daily water flow variations create riverbank erosion. In the Sesan River,
this is-particularly in the dry season - regarded by many of the people
living in the area in Cambodia as a major problem. Animal populations
e.g. birds, reptiles and crustaceans, insect larvae have been impacted by
high water level fluctuations as several species have their nesting,
breeding and foraging areas associated with the river water, sand banks
and river banks. 6°
Furthermore, the communities downstream have traditionally utilized the
exposed fertile river banks and sand bars to grow supplementary seasonal crops,
which have provided an important source of food security, especially in the dry
season. 61 Wyatt, notes that, "[t]he unpredictable nature of the river has caused
54. SWECO, surpa note 13, at 62.
55. Michael Lerner, Dangerous Waters: Violations of International Law and Hydropower Development
Along the Sesan River, (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3, on file with author). Lerner cites Tran Minh Huan,
Director General, Department of International Cooperation, Vietnam National Mekong Committee, who states
in 8' November 2002 during a workshop held at Ubon Ratchathani University that, "We are very sorry for the
losses of the people living downstream on the Sesan River in Cambodia. Caused, of course, by releasing water
from the Yali Falls dam's reservoir in February 2000."
56. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 431.
57. SWECO, supra note 13, at 63.
58. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 432; SWECO, supra note 13, at 63.
59. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 432.
60. NESHEIM ET AL., supra note 52, at 3,
61. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 433.
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some villages to move inland into forested areas, which has in turn created its
own impacts. 62
2. Water Quality
Communities living next to the Sesan River in Cambodia have observed a
range of water quality problems since the construction and operation of
hydropower projects upstream in Vietnam. Increased turbidity in the Sesan,
likely linked to riverbed erosion and increased sedimentation, has been reported
since construction of Yali Dam commenced.63  Communities have also reported
"bad smells" from the river at various times, particularly during the wet season
floods. 4  Since 1996, there have been reported increases in health related
problems associated with the river including itchiness, bumps and eye irritation
after bathing, respiratory problems, throat and nostril irritation, dizziness and
vomiting after drinking water.65
3. Socio-economic Impacts
Hydropower development and the changes in the hydrological regime, as
mentioned above, have had a significant impact on human livelihood systems.
Perhaps the greatest impact has been on food security. Fisheries have
traditionally been an important source of food and protein for villagers reliant on
the Sesan.66 However, fish stocks have been severely affected by changes in the
river and water quality. Fish stocks have declined significantly, particularly in
large fish species, disease amongst fish has increased, and fishing gear and boats
have been washed away.67 However, it should also be noted that changes in
62. ld. at 431.
63. SWECO, supra note 13, at 133.
64. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 433. SWECO, supra note 13, at 132. SWECO, notes that, "in the first years
after the Yali regulation, it is assessed (by interviews and NGO-reports) that the water has increased content of
suspended (erosion material), and most likely algae produced from nutrient released by decomposing terrestrial
litter in the reservoir. This has most likely caused problems for the Cambodians with respect to the use of the
water as untreated drinking water. The algae made the water small badly, and they have some toxic effect of
skin irritation, eye irritations, as well as respiratory problems, headache and stomach ache after the drinking of
water. These are all typical symptoms from some blue green algae, most likely of the genus lyngbya (cf L.
woolei). SWECO, supra note 13, at 132.
65. SWECO, supra note 13, at 63-64 (report notes that, "Toxic algae are the only water quality problem
that can have potential of killing large animals and people.").
66. See generally BRUCE MCKENNEY, OXFAM AMERICA, ECONOMIC VALUATION OF LIVELIHOODS
INCOME LOSSES AND OTHER TANGIBLE DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS FROM THE YALI FALLS DAM TO THE SESAN
RIVER BASIN IN RATANIKIRI PROVINCE, CAMBODIA 5 (2001) (Indicating that in the districts of O'Yadao,
Andong Meas, Ta Veng, and Ven Say eighty percent of families fish during the high season).
67. SWECO, supra note 13, at 65 (report notes that: "[b]ased on the studies of fish species and historical
reports of fish, and interviews it is very likely that fish numbers and species in the Se San River have been
reduced. What this reduction is due to is unclear, although the filling of the Ialy dam and erosion related
impacts on water quality could certainly have contributed to the reduction."); Wyatt, supra note 30, at 433
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fishing techniques that include the use of nylon fishing nets, intensified fishing
due to population increases and illegal fishing methods such as the use of
dynamite, electricity and poisons, have also contributed to fish decreases. River
bank agricultural has also been affected by the hydropower development due to
the high water level fluctuations and flood episodes. Traditionally households
would rely on riverbank and backyard gardening, but these areas have been
abandoned due to the unpredictable flows. 6  Rice cultivation and vegetable lots
have also been affected by "lack of ample water levels at the onset of the wet
season, [and] too much water during floods. 69
As described above, water quality impacts have also had a negative impact
on the health of the inhabitants along the Sesan, which in term affects the
economic and social productivity of communities living along the river. 0
V. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1995 MEKONG AGREEMENT
Transboundary water cooperation in the Mekong River Basin dates back to
the early 1950s with the establishment of the Mekong Committee, between
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. One example of this cooperation
was when in 1975 the Mekong Committee adopted the Joint Declaration of
Principles for the Utilization of the Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin 2
Conflict and political changes within the region proved a major barrier to the
implementation of the Joint Declaration in the 1970s, and eventually in 1978
Thailand, Laos and Vietnam established an Interim Mekong Committee. 3 The
Interim Committee lasted until the early 1990s when a push for the Agreement
(author observes that: "Fish catches have reportedly declined dramatically, with larger fish species affected to a
greater extent... The declines are linked to a number of factors. The first is that increased turbidity and sediment
loads (from increased riverbank erosion) have reduced the light available for algal growth, or smothered
bottom-growing algae, which are an important food source for some species. High sediment loads have also
damaged important fish habitat, such as deep-water pools, through sediment deposition and in-filling. The
increased turbitdity has also affected species that do not tolerate high-sediment loads, which cause gill irritation.
In addition, non-seasonal fluctuations in the Sesan river flows are believed to have caused miratory
disorientation in fish species where migration is triggered by monsoon cycles.").
68. SWECO, supra note 13, at 134 (report states that, "River Bank agriculture is highly reduced at
present due to the high water level fluctuations and flood episodes, and weak bank slopes. Backyard gardening
is also hindered due to the unpredictable water level situation. A general abadoning of river side agriclutural
areas may be increasing. River related vegetation used by local communities for food is reduced.").
69. SWECO, supra note 13, at 134.
70. SWECO, supra note 13, at 138 (report explains that, "at present riverside people feel insecure about
the river due to past accidents related to water level changes and floods in the Se San River. They have also
expereienced other negative developments like reducing fish stocks and increasing cattle and skin diseases
during the past ten years. Learning about the existence of the Ialy dam people now seem to connect all
occurring negative phenomena in their environment to the dam.").
71. See MIKIYASU NAKAYAMA, TRANSITION FROM MEKONG COMMITTEE TO MEKONG RIVER
COMMISSION 2, available at http://www.wrrc.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/-aphw/APHW2004/proceedings/APHW-
Others/56-OTH-A695/56-OTH-A695.pdf.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id.
2010 /Governing the Tributaries of the Mekong
on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin
(Mekong Agreement), with support from UNDP, commenced in earnest. The
subsequent Mekong Agreement was signed by Cambodia, Lao, Thailand and
Vietnam on the 5th April 1995. Neither the upstream Mekong Basin States of
China and Myanmar were parties to the Agreement.
A key question to consider is whether the 1995 Mekong Agreement applies
to hydropower activities within a transboundary tributary of the Mekong. Article
1 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement requires the parties:
To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization,
management and conservation of the water and related resources of the
Mekong River Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydro-
power, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation
and tourism, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and mutual
benefits of all riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that might
result from natural occurrences and man-made activities.74
Reading Article 1 in isolation, the scope of the Mekong Agreement appears
wide ranging, both in terms of physical and functional aspects.
In relation to physical scope, the 1995 Mekong Agreement relates to the
"Mekong River Basin," a term that is synonymous with that of "drainage basin,"
as used in the ILA's 1966 Helsinki Rules.75 In the latter instrument, the term
"international drainage basin" is defined as, "a geographical area extending over
two or more States determined by the watersheds limits of the system of waters,
including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus. 76
Such a definition, in its reference to "a system of waters," would imply that the
Agreement covers both the mainstream of the Mekong and its tributaries. As
noted by the ILC, the "system of surface and groundwaters," comprises, "a
number of different components through which water flows, both on and under
the surface of the land. These components include rivers, lakes, aquifers, glaciers,
reservoirs and canals. So long as these components are interrelated with one
another, they form part of the watercourse., 77 Pursuant to Article 1, the Sesan
River, as a tributary of the Mekong, would therefore fall under the agreement.
In terms of the functional scope, the Mekong Agreements seeks to be all
encompassing, thus covering, "all fields of sustainable development, utilization,
management and conservation." It is therefore clear, at least from reading Article
74. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 1,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3,.
75. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Int'l Rivers, 52 INT'L L. ASs'N REP. 484, 484-85
(1966), available at http://www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/helsinki-rules.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Int'l Watercourses, 90,
U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (May, 2-July. 22, 1994), reprinted in [ 1994] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 222.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 22
1, that the 1995 Mekong Agreement covers both hydropower and its impact in
the Sesan.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO THE SESAN
A. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization
The Mekong Agreement also provides certain substantive norms. Article 5
incorporates the primary principle of international water law, equitable and
reasonable utilization.8 Cambodia and Vietnam are therefore subject to the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, both under treaty law and
customary international law.
The parties are accordingly obliged, "to utilize the waters of the Mekong
River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective territories,
pursuant to all relevant factors and circumstances . 79  In commenting on the
application of principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, the ILC provides:
In many cases, the quality and quantity of water in an international
watercourse will be sufficient to satisfy the needs of all watercourse States. But
where the quantity or quality of the water is such that all the reasonable and
beneficial uses of all watercourse States cannot be fully realized, a "conflict of
uses" results. In such a case, international practice recognizes that some
adjustments or accommodations are required in order to preserve each
watercourse State's equality of right. These adjustments or accommodations are
to be arrived at on the basis of equity... 80
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization is not prescriptive in
terms of which uses should take priority. Rather, as noted in the Wiirttemberg
Case:
The application of this principle is governed by the circumstances of
each particular case. The interests of the States in question must be
weighed in an equitable manner against one another. One must consider
not only the absolute injury caused to the neighboring State, but also the
relation of the advantage gained by one to the injury caused to the other.8'
Ultimately, the aim in determining what is equitable and reasonable is to
endeavor to attain, "optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there
78. See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 384-405 (2nd ed.,
2007).
79. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 5,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
80. 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 77, at 99.
81. Wtirttemberg and Prussia v. Baden, 86 Ann. Dig. 128, 131 (German Staatsgerichtshof 1927).
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from, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned,
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse."8
Article 6 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors and circumstances that should be taken into account
when balancing the interests of States, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse
States;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse
State on other watercourse States;
(d) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(e) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to
that effect;
(f) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular
planned or existing use."
(g) Article 10 of the UN Watercourses Convention further stipulates
that, "[i]n the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use
of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other
uses."
4
In the context of the Sesan, it is clear that the development of hydropower
has had an impact on the downstream interests. However, as the Wtirttemberg
Case notes, the principle of equity requires that "not only the absolute injury
caused to the neighboring State" be considered, but also, "the relation of the
advantage gained by one to the injury caused to the other. 8 5 While the SWECO
report, commissioned by EVN, highlights a number of negative impacts to
downstream Cambodia interests directly attributable to the development of
hydropower upstream in Cambodia, a key question remains unanswered: whether
the benefits of hydropower development upstream outweigh the costs
downstream in an equitable and reasonable manner. The difficultly in
82. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 5, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
83. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 6, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
84. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 10, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
85. W(irttemberg, supra note 81, at 13 1.
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determining whether such uses are equitable and reasonable lies in the need to
take into account all relevant factors and circumstances in an objective manner.86
A detailed analysis of such relevant factors and circumstances demands
strong collaboration between the States sharing the resource in order to establish,
inter alia, the physical characteristics of the resource, the population dependent
upon it, the range of existing and potential uses of the water, the impacts of such
use, and possible opportunities for more efficient alternative uses. No single
state can ascertain these factors by themselves, as many will be contingent upon
the knowledge of the entire watercourse system. Factors and circumstances may
also change over time. Ultimately, determining what uses are equitable and
reasonable will be reliant on strong existing collaboration between the
watercourse States, or third party intervention. As noted above, the political and
historical background of relations between Vietnam and Cambodia has meant
that strong collaboration during the time when hydropower was developed on the
Sesan in the 1980s and 1990s was problematic. However, a key question that
remains is whether the Mekong River Commission, or another third party
institution, could have played a role in determining what uses of the watercourse
were equitable and reasonable. The latter question will be considered within the
following sections of the paper.
B. The Obligation to Take All Appropriate Measures to Prevent Significant
Harm
Article 7 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement obliges that States, "make every
effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the
environment, especially the water quantity and quality, the aquatic (eco-system)
conditions, and ecological balance of the river system, from the development and
use of the Mekong River Basin water resources or discharges of wastes and
return flows.
7
The obligation contained in Article 7 represents an elaboration a principle of
customary international law. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice commented
that, "[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment."88
86. See PATRICIA K. WOUTERS ET AL., SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS-AN INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT OF EQUITABLE ENTITLEMENT: THE LEGAL ASSESSMENT MODEL 22 (2005), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001397/139794e.pdf.
87. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 7,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
88. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Jul. 8).
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Similarly, the Trail Smelter Arbitration stipulated that:
[U]nder the principles of international law.., no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.89
Article 7 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention reflects this principle,
providing that "[w]atercourse States shall, in utilizing an international
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the
causing of significant harm to other watercourse States."' The ILC Commentary
to Article 7 provides further elaboration by stating that:
[A] watercourse State whose use causes significant harm can be deemed
to have breached its obligation to exercise due diligence so as not to
cause significant harm only when it has intentionally or negligently
caused the event which had to be prevented or has intentionally or
negligently not prevented others in its territory from causing that event or
has abstained from abating it.9'
The ILC defines "significant" as "something more than "detectable," but
need not be at the level of "serious" or "substantial." The harm must lead to a
real detrimental effect on matters such as, for example, human health, industry,
property, environment or agriculture in other States." 92
In the case of the Sesan, the harm to interests downstream in Cambodia
appears to meet the criteria of "significant," as defined by the ILC. Hydropower
development upstream has probably had impacts on water quality, which in turn
has probably had an impact on human health and the environment. There is,
however, no clear-cut evidence of this to date. Similarly, unusual flooding events
and fluctuation in river flow have resulted in the loss of livestock and may on
some occasions have been responsible for events such as: loss of human life;
negative effects on livelihoods; property and the destruction of crops; and the
cumulative impacts of hydropower development has arguably contributed
significantly to substantial decline in fish stocks. However, as with the principle
of equitable and reasonable utilization, determining whether Vietnam's use of the
Sesan has had a negative impact downstream in Cambodia will ultimately require
either close collaboration between the parties or third party intervention.
89. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941).
90. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 7, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
91. 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 77, at 103.
92. Id. at 165.
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What is more, the obligation to prevent significant harm is one of due
diligence, namely that States must "take all appropriate measures" to prevent
significant harm. In other words, proving that the harm took place is not enough;
it must also be shown that a State failed to take the appropriate measures to
prevent such harm. A similar approach is used in Article 7 of the 1995 Mekong
Agreement in the use of the phrase, "to make every effort." 93 A key question is
therefore not whether significant harm occurred, but whether such harm was
"internationally or negligently" caused.
In the Alabama Case, "due diligence" was described as, "a diligence
proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the dignity and strength of
the power which is exercising it .... ,94 More recently, "due diligence" has been
described as:
The degree of care in question is that expected of a good Government. In
other words, the Government concerned should possess, on a permanent
basis, a legal system and material resources sufficient to ensure the
fulfillment of its international obligations. To that end, the State must
also establish and maintain an adequate administrative apparatus.
However, it is understood that the degree of care expected of a State with
well-developed economic, human and material resources and with highly
evolved systems and structures of governance is not the same as for
States which are not in such a position.9
A key question to consider is therefore whether the degree of care that
Vietnam demonstrated in developing hydropower on the Sesan was
commensurate with that expected of a State with similarly evolved systems and
structures of governance. Ultimately, such an obligation boils down to
consideration of whether the process by which the decision to develop
hydropower on the Sesan provided a sufficient degree of care.
One final point to note in relation to the no significant harm obligation
pertains to its relationship with the principle of equitable and reasonable
utilization. Traditionally, the question of which principle should take priority
over the other has been subject to much debate.96 However, with the adoption of
93. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 7,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
94. JOHN BASSErr MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INT'L ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY VOLUME I572-73 (1898).
95. Int'l Law Comm'n, Second Report on Int'l Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts
not Prohibited by Int'l Law, 31, UN Doc. A/CN.4/50 t (May 5, 1999) (prepared by Pemmaraju Sreenivasa
Rao).
96. See Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in Int'l Water Disputes: That of Reasonableness or
that of No Harm?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635 (1996); Patricia K. Wouters, An Assessment of Recent
Development in Int'l Watercourse Law Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation,
36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 417 (1996); Reaz Rahman,, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Int'l Watercourses:
Dilemma for Lower Riparians, 19 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 9 (1995).
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the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, it appears that the widely accepted
position is that the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization takes priority.
Accordingly, Article 7(2) of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, provides
that, "[w]here significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement
to such use, take all appropriate measures having due regard to the provisions of
articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation". 97
Reference to articles 5 and 6 (equitable and reasonable utilization), in effect
recognizes that, where it can be shown that significant harm occurs, but it can
also be proven that such harm is equitable and reasonable, a State will be in
compliance with international law.
Within the context of the Sesan, a key question to consider is therefore not
only whether appropriate measures were taken to prevent significant harm, but
also whether significant harm occurred, and if so, whether such harm was
consistent with the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Clearly,
ascertaining whether States are in compliance with such an obligation will
require close collaboration or third party intervention.
C. The Protection of Aquatic Ecosystems
A further point to note in relation to Article 7 of the 1995 Mekong
Agreement is that the obligation, "[t]o make every effort to avoid, minimize and
mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the environment, especially the water
quantity and quality, the aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and ecological balance
of the river system. . ." does not explicitly mention that such harm need be
transboundary. 9s An obligation to protect the environment per se is supported in
Article 3 of the Agreement, which stipulates that the parties agree to, "protect the
environment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological
balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects
resulting from any development plans and uses of water and related resources in
the Basin." 99
Such an approach is consistent with Article 20 of the 1997 UN Watercourses
Convention, stipulating that, "[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where
appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international
watercourses. '"'0° McCaffrey in reviewing watercourse agreements observed that,
97. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 7, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
98. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 7,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
99. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 3,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
100. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 20, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
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"[i]t seems possible to conclude ... that there is now at least an emerging
obligation to protect international watercourse systems and their ecosystems
against degradation."'0 ' It may be further maintained that the obligation to
protect the environment or ecosystems is part and parcel of the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization. McCaffrey therefore argues that, "causing
significant harm to the ecosystems of an international watercourse should be
considered per se inequitable and unreasonable."'' 02
Clearly the construction and operation of hydropower in the Sesan has
caused quantitative and qualitative changes in the river. In addition to the
question of whether the hydropower development is consistent with the
principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, and the obligation to take all
appropriate measures to avoid and mitigate significant harm, a more specific
issue is whether such uses are consistent with a general obligation to protect the
ecosystem of the Mekong River Basin. Such an obligation is widely recognized
as a due diligence obligation. As with the issue of significant harm in general, a
key question to consider is therefore not whether the ecosystem is harmed but
whether appropriate measures were taken for its protection.
VII. PROCEDURAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
APPLICABLE TO THE SESAN
In the above analysis of the substantive norms applicable to the Sesan, it has
been suggested that effective implementation of such norms is largely contingent
on strong collaboration between the parties or third party intervention. Bourne
picked up on the latter point in relation to procedural rules when he noted that:
The substantive law on the utilization of the waters of international drainage
basins is defined in the vague language of the doctrine of 'equitable utilization'
and offers little guidance to states on how they may proceed lawfully with the
utilization of these waters in their territories. Shortcomings in the substantive
law, however, may be offset to some extent by a body of procedural law.'0 3
This section of the paper will therefore consider the most relevant issues
relating to procedural rules and institutional mechanisms applicable the Sesan.
Ultimately, the section will consider the extent to which such rules and
mechanisms are capable of supporting the effective implementation of the
substantive norms described above.
101. MCCAFFREY, supra note 78, at 457; See also OWEN MCINTYRE, ENVTL. PROTECTION OF INT'L
WATERCOURSES UNDER INT'L LAW (2007).
102. MCCAFFREY, supra note 78, at 458.
103. Charles B. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of Int'l Drainage Basins: Notice and Exchange
of Information, in INT'L WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 143 (Patricia
Wouters ed. 1997).
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A. The Institutional Framework Applicable to the Sesan
The institution charged with coordinating the Mekong Agreement is the
Mekong River Commission ("MRC"); the four parties to the Mekong Agreement
are members of the MRC. In addition, both China and Myanmar enjoy observer
status. The four goals of the MRC for 2006-2010 are: one, "[t]o promote and
support coordinated, sustainable, and pro-poor development; two, "[t]o enhance
effective regional cooperation; three, "[t]o strengthen basin-wide environmental
monitoring and impact assessment"; and four "[t]o strengthen the Integrated
Water Resources Management capacity and knowledge base of the MRC bodies,
National Mekong Committees, Line Agencies, and other stakeholders."'
'
14
As noted in the fourth goal, one of the MRC main aims is to strengthen the
capacity of the National Mekong Committees ("NMC") and other stakeholders.
In the case of the Sesan the important national committees are the Cambodia
national Mekong Committee (based in Phnom Penh) and the Vietnam national
Mekong Committee (based in Hanoi). The NMCs coordinate MRC programs at
the national level through NMC Secretariats in each country, and provide links
between the MRC Secretariat and the appropriate national ministries and line
agencies. The organization of the NMC is left to the discretion of the individual
countries.
In relation to Vietnam and Cambodia, the main authorities responsible for
water and environmental management at the central state level are in Cambodia
the Ministry of Environment ("MOE") and the Ministry of Water Resources and
Meteorology ("MOWRAM"). In Vietnam the Ministry of Natural Resources and
the Environment ("MONRE") and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development ("MARD") share responsibilities for water, MONRE has
traditionally been responsible for water quality and MARD for water quantity,
especially the use of water for agriculture. Overlapping responsibilities, such as
those in Vietnam where two ministries compete for jurisdiction over water,
complicate management of the Sesan. In Cambodia, the weak State structure and
power of the ministries is a contributing factor to problems of implementation.
The MRC itself consists of three permanent bodies: the Council, the Joint
Committee ("JC") and the Secretariat. The Council meets once a year and
consists of one member from each country at ministerial or cabinet level. It is
also responsible for the overall governance of the Mekong, makes policy
decisions and provides other necessary guidance. The JC consists of one
member from each country at no less than Head of Department level and is
responsible for the implementation of the policies and decisions of the Council.
It also supervises the activities of the Mekong River Commission Secretariat and
functions as a board of management. The MRC Secretariat is the operational arm
216
104. See Mekong River Comm'n, http://www.mrcmekong.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
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of the MRC and provides technical and administrative services to the JC and the
Council.
Eventual conflicts are managed by the Council, or between regular Council
sessions by the Joint Committee.' 5 If two or more countries disagree as to issues
covered by the Agreement the commission will attempt to resolve the issue.' 6 If
the Council or the JC cannot resolve a dispute in a reasonable length of time, the
issue may be referred to the national governments for resolution by negotiation.
If the governments in question want additional assistance, they may, by mutual
agreement, also request the assistance of mediation.' 7
The position of the MRC is therefore primarily one of a mediator and a
facilitator of discussions between representatives of the national governments. In
its structure it is similar to the European Union with its Council of Ministers as
its highest decision-making body, and a European Commission consisting of
representatives of the member states (with similar functions to the MRC JC) on
the one hand, and on the other, a core of professional administrators within the
Directorate General, which is the unit that deals with the implementation of
specific issues. '" What the MRC does not have, however, is an elected
parliament of representatives from the member states. The MRC also shares
some of the weaknesses of the EU; that is, it can formulate policy, but the
implementation of that policy is in the hands of the national governments. Of
course, the position of the MRC is much weaker than that of the EU, partly
because it does not have its own source of income, and partly because EU law
takes precedence over the national law of the EU member states.
The MRC is therefore in a position in which diplomacy, negotiation, and
persuasion are the main tools at its disposal. As such, although the MRC was
established by a formal Agreement, it is still largely depending upon the good
will of its member States. This should be kept in mind when looking at the role
of the MRC in the Sesan River.
B. Procedural Rules Applicable to the Sesan
The 1995 Mekong Agreement obliges parties to notify each other of any
proposed intra-basin uses and inter-basin diversions, both on the tributaries and
the mainstream of the Mekong.'09 A key caveat to notification is that, "domestic
105. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 34,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
106. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 34,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
107. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 35,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
108. MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION, MRC ANNUAL REPORT 2008: ORGANISATION DIAGRAM OF MRC,
http://www.mrcmekong.org/annual-report/2008/organisation.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
109. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 5,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3 (provides that prior consultation is required before inter-basin diversions on the
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and minor uses of water not having a significant impact on mainstream flows""
are excluded from the notification procedures."' Notification of proposed uses
that only have an impact on the tributaries of the Mekong are therefore excluded
from the Agreement.
However, in relation to emergency situations, the obligation to notify and
consult relates to, "any special water quantity or quality problems," which
presumably covers both the mainstream and tributaries.' 2 While not defined in
the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention defines an
"emergency" as, "a situation that causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing,
serious harm to watercourse States or other States and that results suddenly from
natural causes, such as floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or earthquakes,
or from human conduct, such as industrial accidents."
'" 3
The obligation to notify and consult over planned measures is also supported
under customary international law. The obligation finds expression in Article 12
of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which provides:
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of
planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon
other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely
notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available
technical data and information, including the results of any
environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States
to evaluate the possible effects of planned measures.114
Such "measures" are defined as, "including new projects or programs of a
major or minor nature, as well as changes in existing uses of an international
watercourse. '""' In addition, the use of the term, "significant adverse effect," is
intended to provide a lower threshold that that of "significant harm."" 6
mainstream of the Mekong, and intra-basin uses during the dry season.).
110. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin
Chapter II, Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).
11. Int'l Law Comm'n, 2001 Annual Report, at 388, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. "Significant" is defined by the
Commentaries to the Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, as being, "something more than "detectable" but need not be at the level of "serious" or "substantial."
Id. The harm must lead to a real deleterious effect on matters such as, for example, human health, industry,
property, environment or agriculture in other States. Such detrimental effects must be susceptible of being
measured by factual and objective standards." Id.
112. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 10,
Apr. 5, 1995,2069 U.N.T.S. 3.
113. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 28, May 21.
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
114. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 12, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
115. 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 77, at I l1.
116. id. at 111.
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Following a notification procedure laid out in Articles 13-15 of the 1997 UN
Watercourses Convention, if a watercourse State deems the planned measures to
contravene the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, then there is a
duty to enter into consultations, and possible negotiations, with a view to arriving
at an equitable solution.
In the context of proposed uses, "prior consultation" is described under the
1995 Mekong Agreement as, "neither a right to veto the use nor unilateral right
to use water by any riparian without taking into account other riparian's rights.'0
7
The latter definition reflects the need to provide a healthy balance between State
interests. On the one hand, a requirement that States must agree to plan measures
prior to their execution could stall legitimate developments. On the other hand,
failure to consult could jeopardize the rights of the potentially affected State.
Ultimately, the above analysis of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and
customary international law leads to the conclusion that Vietnam is subject to
obligations to notify Cambodia of certain activities on the Sesan. While the 1995
Mekong Agreement was not in force when construction of Yali started, and
would limit notification of planned measures to those impacting the mainstream
of the Mekong, customary international law obliges Vietnam to notify Cambodia
of any activities that might have a significant adverse effect downstream. The
hydropower projects on the upstream section of the Sesan would therefore be
subject to notification and consultation under customary international law. In
addition, pursuant to the 1995 Mekong Agreement, Vietnam is also obliged to
notify Cambodia of "emergency situations.""' It could therefore be argued that
variations in the flow of the Sesan could be categorized as, "a situation that
causes or poses an imminent threat of causes, serious harm to watercourse
States... and that results suddenly... from human conduct... ,,,9 The
variation of the Sesan's flow, which occurred as a result of the construction and
operation of Yali, could be classified as an emergency situation.
A key question to consider is therefore the extent to which Vietnam fulfilled
its obligations under the 1995 Mekong Agreement and customary international
law relating to notification and consultation.
In relation to Yali, Ojendal et al, comment that,
Our understanding is that Vietnam did give notification at some stage,
but not in enough detail or leaving enough time for it to make a
difference, or simply that the Cambodian authorities did not recognize it
as such. Obviously, the information never reached the right level or the
117. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin
Chapter II, Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S.
118. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 10,
Apr. 5, 1995, 2069 U.N.T.S.
119. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 28, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
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right authorities. The problem here seems to be twofold: firstly there is
no shared understanding of what a notification should involve, what it
should contain, and when it should be issued. Secondly there is no
proactive institution which can spot the misunderstandings and back up
the faltering process. 20
Ojendal's statement indicates that there are two major problems: the first is
Vietnam's compliance (or not) with its responsibilities; the second is the lack of
institutional capacity of Cambodia to act on notification. This lack of
institutional capacity in Cambodia, probably partly a result of the Khmer Rouge
eradication of intellectuals and managers during the Pol Pot years, continues to
create problems for rural Cambodians, who in many ways are left on their own to
manage the detrimental effects of Vietnamese HEP developments.
It has been maintained that, due to the security situation, and Cambodia's
absence from the interim Mekong Committee, a full assessment of the
downstream impact of Yali was not possible in the early 1990s. However,
according to a statement from the Mekong River Commission, notification was
made to the Joint Committee on 20th September 1997.121 In addition, Vietnam
provided notification of Sesan 3 to the MRC Secretariat on 17th March 2000.
This was followed by a formal notification to the 11 th Meeting of the MRC Joint
Committee on 28-29th March 2000.22 According to the MRC's statement,
notification was followed by a commitment by Vietnam and Cambodia to consult
over the downstream impacts of the proposed hydropower projects in Vietnam.
In 2000 the MRC facilitated a meeting of Cambodian and Vietnamese
governments to visit the Yali Falls Dam. An outcome of this meeting was, inter
alia, an agreement that "[i]nformation on reservoir operation, in particular water
release, under normal and extreme conditions, should be exchanged sufficiently
in advance through appropriate channels;" "[u]nder normal circumstances, about
15 days advance notice on changes should apply, through national Mekong
committees (NMCs), relevant provincial authorities and the MRCS; and "[u]nder
emergencies and extreme flood situations, warning should be immediately
dispatched directly to relevant levels." '23 During field trips conducted by the
authors in Cambodia in 2007 and 2008, local village representatives claimed that
this system of advance information was still not in place. Whether this depended
on the lack of information provision by the Vietnamese government, or lack of
communication of information from the central authorities of Cambodia to the
provincial and local levels, is difficult to say.
120. Ojendal, supra note 22, at 56.
121. Press Release, Mekong River Comm'n, Statement from the Mekong River Comm'n on Issues
Relating to Yali Falls Dam and Sesan 3 Hydropower Plant Project (Nov. 26, 2002).
122. Id.
123. NGO Forum on Cambodia, supra note 35, at 53-54.
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A further issue, closely related to that of notification, is the obligation to
conduct Environmental Impact Assessments when carrying out hydropower
developments. It could be maintained that customary international law places
States under certain obligations to conduct environmental impacts assessments,
when carrying out planned measures on international watercourses. ' 24 More
specifically, an obligation to assess the potentially harmful environmental effects
may be derived from a modern day interpretation of the due diligence-as
described above in relation to the Mekong Agreement and customary
international law.
A series of environmental impact assessments have been carried out for the
Sesan River. In the case of the Yali Dam, an EIA was conducted by Electrowatt,
a Swiss consultancy firm, on behalf of EVN and in coordination with the Interim
Mekong Committee. 25  After the World Bank reportedly pulled out due to
concerns over resettlement policies, the EIA was funded by the Swiss
Government at a cost of $1,190,000 dollars. The EJA did not consider
downstream impacts in Cambodia, only considering an area eight kilometers long
and one kilometer wide below the dam. 27  As such, it is likely that the
Cambodian government was not consulted during the EIA process.121
Due to criticisms related to the Yali Dam, ADB launched the idea that Sesan
3 should be, "a model hydropower project managed commercially and adopting
internationally recommended operational, financial, environmental, and social
practices". 29 Following the initial "technical, environmental, and social analysis
124. See Giinther Handel, The Env't:: Int'l Rights and Responsibilities, 74 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
223 (1980); Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in Int'l Envtl. Agreements, 62 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 275,
280; Atilla Tanzi& Maurizio Arcari, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES-A FRAMEWORK FOR SHARING 205 (2001) (Tanzi and Arcari state that, "[ilt is self-evident
that the planning State could hardly substantiate the argument that it has taken all the appropriate measures to
prevent causing significant harm if it had not made a prior assessment of the impact that the planned measures
would have on the environment, with special regard to that of its co-riparians"); Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes art. 3(1), Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312. ,
Article 3(1) of the convention stipulates that, "[t]o prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact, the Parties
shall develop, adopt, implement and, as far as possible, render compatible relevant legal, administrative,
economic, financial and technical measures, in order to ensure, inter alia, that.., environmental impact
assessment and other means of assessment are applied." Id. See also Int'l Law Ass'n, Annual Report, 67 INT'L
ASS'N REP. CONF. 401, 414 (1996). The Int'l Law Association's supplementary Rules on Pollution, provides
that, "in using the waters of an international drainage basin, States individually or jointly as appropriate shall
ensure prior assessment of the impact of programmes or projects that may have singificnat transboundayr effect
on the environment or on the sustaianble use of the waters." Id. See also Convention on Evironmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800.
125. CHRIS LANG ET AL, DAMS INCORPORATED: THE RECORD OF TWELVE EUROPEAN DAM BUILDING
COMPANIES 45 (2000), available at http://www.rivemet.org/generalldams/dams-inc.zip.




129. KATHLEEN M. MOKTAN, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TA NO. 3222-VIE: PREPARING THE SE SAN
3 HYDROPOWER PROJECT (2001), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/TACRs/VIE/IN268_01 .pdf.
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of Se San 3" completed in 2001,30 ADB opined that further environmental and
social analysis was required to assess the likely impacts of Sesan 3 both in
Vietnam and Cambodia. 3 In response, the Vietnamese Government decided to
complete the environmental and social analysis internally and sought alternative
funding for the project. The environmental impacts assessments for the Sesan 3
were not made publicly available. A letter from ADB's NGO Liaison Officer to
a Cambodian NGO explains, "[imn response to earlier requests for this report,
ADB requested approval from the Government of Vietnam to release it.
However, the Government has declined to provide such approval and considers
the report confidential ... As a result, ADB does not have the authority to release
the report."'32 The EIAs for the Sesan 3A and Plei Krong dams have never been
published.'
The Sesan 4 EIA was published by the Ministry of Industry and the
Vietnamese National Mekong Committee in 2005. However, according to the
Wyatt and Baird (2007), it does not meet international standards, as it "lacks
basic baseline information and fails to present other essential information such as
operational characteristics of upstream dams, using assumptions to backstop
many conclusions."' 34 Additionally, the EIA process has been criticized due to
the EIA not having been approved prior to construction.1
35
Additionally, EVN has commissioned an Environmental Impact Assessment
on the Cambodian part of the Se San River due to hydropower development in
Vietnam, which was completed in December 2006.36 The EIA sought to evaluate
the social, economic and environmental impacts of existing and planned
hydropower projects, and to suggest mitigation and enhancement measures
during the operation of existing projects and the construction of new
hydroelectric projects. The key findings of the EIA have been mentioned above
relating to the impacts of hydropower projects. In relation to the process, the
NGO Forum on Cambodia criticized the fact that the report was not released until
the end of May 2007, only one week before a meeting organized by the
Vietnamese and Cambodian National Mekong Committees to review the report.
A number of NGOs declined the invitation to attend the meeting on the basis of




132. Wyatt, supra note 30, at 435.
133. Id. at 435.
134. Id. at 435.
135. Id. at 435.
136. See SWECO, supra note 13.
137. PROBE INT'L FOR THE NGO FORUM ON CAMBODIA, REVIEW OF ELECTRICITY OF VIETNAM'S
ENVIROMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) ON THE CAMBODIAN PART OF THE SE SAN RIVER DUE TO
HYDROPOWER DEV. IN VIETNAM 2 (2007), available at http://www.probeinternational.org/files/pdfs/muwI
SeSanEIA _ReviewProbelnternational.pdf.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The paper has shown that having international laws or institutions in place is
not enough; cases similar to the Sesan show there is a need for strong co-
ordination between the two. One of the underlying challenges of the Mekong
Agreement and customary international law is that several of the substantive
rules and principles have an inherent ambiguity. Equitable and reasonable, for
instance, will be interpreted differently depending on the local context; and
similarly, what measures to prevent significant harm are considered appropriate
will vary depending on the State concerned. While such ambiguity can be an
advantage in that it prevents such norms from being too rigid to cope with
unpredictable changes in circumstances, ambiguity can also lead to weak
implementation or result in highly subjective interpretations. Ultimately, while
clear precise rules may not be possible, what is needed is a strong procedural and
institutional mechanism by which such rules can be interpreted in an objective
manner.
Unfortunately, the case of the Sesan illustrates that ambiguity within the
substantive norms applicable to the river, has been matched by weak procedural
rules and institutional mechanisms. It has been unclear whether the notification
procedures provided under the Mekong Agreement even apply to some of the
hydropower developments. Such findings also apply to the procedural rules
relating to notification, and environmental impact assessment procedures.
Similarly, we have seen that the institutional design of the MRC means that it is
in a position where diplomacy, negotiation and persuasion are its 'main tools'. A
further point to bear in mind is that fact that implementation is largely reliant on
there being the necessary national laws and institutions in place. In fact, strong
national laws and institutions in support of the MRC could address some of the
weakness of its mandate. However, Hirsch notes that, "[t]here is no real
consistency between the Mekong Agreement and the national water policies and
legislation of the States that are signatory to it. Scarcely any reference is made in
the legislation and published policies of the participating countries to the
Agreement or to any of the work of the MRC".13
Such procedural and institutional weaknesses has profoundly affected the
way in which the Sesan river has been utilized; with no clear mandate by which
to ascertain what constitutes an equitable and reasonable use of the river.
A number of areas need strengthening. From a procedural standpoint, a
greater role could be played by environmental impact assessments. While
standards of environmental impact assessment applied by the ADB may ensure
that the issue of whether planned uses are equitable and reasonable could be
considered prior to implementation, the Sesan case shows that States are not
contingent on such institutions for developing such 'best practice' projects
138. PHILLIP HIRSCH ET AL, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND TRANSBOUNDARY WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE
MEKONG xvi (2006).
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standards. A range of funding mechanisms is available, and standards for such
projects differ. The experiences of the Sesan therefore raise the question of
whether there needs to be stronger regional standards for EIAs similar to the UN
ECE ESPOO Convention, possibly under the auspices of the MRC. 39
Reasonable forms of compensation and benefit-sharing also need to be
developed. The weak role of the MRC and uneven power relations between
Vietnam and Cambodia do not provide the platform for negotiations that could
help develop these mechanisms. It is indeed telling that the question of
compensation for the impacts of hydropower development in the Sesan has not
formally been raised by Cambodia. While the institutional arrangements are in
place for such discussions, through the MRC and the national MRC
Commissions (see above), the relative weakness, economically and politically, of
Cambodia in relation to Vietnam, make it difficult for Cambodia to make strong
demands on its neighbor to the east. Vietnam's opinion that relatively few people
have been affected by HEP development on the Sesan has also contributed to this
lack of discussion of compensation. Recently, a number of projects do, however,
seem to be under way; a road is being built along the Sesan in Cambodia with
Vietnamese help, and discussions seem to be progressing concerning aid in the
building of one or more HEP stations on the Sesan in Cambodia. Various
mitigation measures have been proposed, which largely center around the
following:
(i) reducing water fluctuation levels and synchronizing river water levels
with agricultural seasonality; (ii) reducing erosion and stabilizing river
banks; (ii) increasing awareness of vulnerable animals amongst villages;
and (iv) [increasing] community based involvement in conservation and
monitoring."4°
As noted above, Vietnam's commissioning of Sesan 4A as a re-regulation
dam is expected to provide a major contribution to regulating the flow of the
Sesan, although at this stage it is too early to say whether it has been effective.
It could therefore be argued that the greater cooperation between Vietnam
and Cambodia in recent years is ensuring that the activities within the Sesan are
carried out in accordance with the principle of equitable and reasonable
utilization. However, the Sesan experience illustrates the dangers of adopting
'agreements to agree' without sanctioning a strong procedural and institutional
mandate-both at the international and national level.
139. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 800.
140. SWECO, supra note 13, at 153.
